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Abstract  
Access to Confidential Information Regarding Cartels within the EU Context - The 
Management of Information Related to Leniency 
 
 
On 14th March 2017, with the Evonik Case, the European Court of Justice refused a cartel 
member's safeguard to whom the European Commission had conceded protection in exchange for 
information (the Leniency Program). Never before the Commission had been able to publish 
cartel’s documents without protecting its information's source (the Whistleblower). This verdict 
shall allow cartels' Victims to access more information needed to obtain compensation for 
damages, but may jeopardize Commission's Leniency Program. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how undertakings and European Authorities should 
manage the access to confidential information regarding cartels from this point onwards. 
 





Fig. 1 - Leniency Program's Dual Role 
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I. Introduction 
Being able to take a peek at confidential documents regarding investigations into the activity of 
cartels is, among other things, fascinating. Who would pass the opportunity?  
However, attempting to access that information is not just a matter of morbid curiosity. It is more 
often a matter of survival for Victims who have suffered at the hands of cartels and need evidence 
to sue them for damages. It would of course be useless to ask cartel members for such documents. 
They would immediately suspect the applicant’s intention. Therefore, the most used route is to 
apply to institutions such as the European Commission (hereafter the Commission), since it 
collects, and hoards, masses of fairly disorganized information on cartels. 
How does the Commission come by this information? On the one hand, it is the fruit of 
investigations coordinated by Directorate-General (DG) for Competition that is vested with 
significant administrative powers. Indeed, the latter gathers information regardless and in spite of 
the (ill) will of cartel members. On the other hand, DG for Competition has opened a Leniency 
Program. Such a tool seeks out the weakest links of cartels, and invites them to offer up 
information about the cartel and its members, in exchange for impunity. A traitor, or 
Whistleblower, is thus born. The information provided by Whistleblowers is the key to the 
compensation of Victims, but should the Victim have access to that information? 
On the basis of case-law analysis, this Work Project seeks to address the issue of how the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ or the Court) manage access to 
Leniency documents by Victims of cartels. Naturally, the less access is conceded to Victims the 
more trust (and information) will ensue between Whistleblowers and DG Competition. 
Concomitantly, compensation for Victims has been acknowledged as a duty of DG for 
Competition. In this framework who is to be sacrificed? The Whistleblower or the Victim? 
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A cartel1 can be described as a market situation that occurs whenever a group of undertakings 
operate together, eliminating competition, raising the prices above normal and reaching higher 
profits. A cartel formation is an illegal practice against International Commercial Law. Even 
acknowledging that, a lot of undertakings keep on using it as a very profitable strategy2. Besides 
being an obstacle to free-competition, a cartel also damages the final consumer tremendously. 
Case-law of the ECJ as a Basis 
In order to provide the audience with some background, it is pertinent to clarify that the entire set 
of cases chosen for analysis (52 cases on Access to EU Competition Law Documents and about 
33 per cent of those relating to Access to Leniency Documents) regards situations in which a 
private party (more often than not a Victim of a cartel) has applied for access to an investigative 
file or, in other particular cases, in which a private party (probably a cartel member) has sought 
for confidentiality of those files. The point is to study how cartel participants manage two issues: 
deciding to give documents (i.e., information) to the Commission and concomitantly receive 
assurance from the Commission that the latter will impede Victims’ access to information about 
their own undertakings. In order to do that it is also necessary to factor in Victims’ behavior. 
Under European Union (EU) Law3, there are three possible sources of this type of Case-law: two 
EU Regulations and one EU Directive. An EU Regulation is a piece of EU legislation aimed at 
creating Supranational harmonized rules for all Member States, while an EU Directive is a 
Supranational piece of EU Law that instructs Member States to legislate on a certain topic but 
within a framework or objective that the Directive provides and requires. 
																																																						
1	Contrarily to what many tend to think, a cartel is not the same as an oligopoly. An oligopoly occurs when two or 
more big undertakings control the market and set their prices decisions based on the expectations of what the others 
will decide. Even though, oligopoly is not a perfect competition situation, it’s common and it is not prohibited. 
2 Cartels continue to be a very actual topic in everyday news, investigations and Court cases. An example of a Cartel 
that is deeply concerning our Country (Portugal) at the moment is the “Fire Cartel”. 
3 According to Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).	
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Regulation No 1049/2001 
The first source of relevant Case-law arises from the Transparency Regulation (Regulation No 
1049/2001).4 It exists to allow the public access to any type of document held by the Commission, 
including those related to cartels and Leniency statements5.  
Regulation No 1/2003 
This second Regulation lays out the framework for the Commission’s investigation of cartels and 
collection of Leniency statements. Since its main purpose is the collection of information, it is 
highly restrictive of what it is called third-party access. In other words, it does not make room for 
Victims of cartels (who are, by definition, extraneous to the information collection process) to 
vision the information6. If only this Regulation existed it would be almost impossible to access 
cartels’ information. 
Directive 2014/104/EU 
Still there is a third source of Case-law that is relevant. A different type of EU legislative 
instrument, Directive 2014/104/EU was issued to set clearer rules within National legal systems 
on compensation actions following Competition Law infringements. Thus, and since the quest for 
compensation for damages usually takes place in the domestic Courts of the EU Member States, 
some cases (such as Pfleiderer7 and Donau Chemie8) are related to Preliminary Rulings of the 
ECJ. These take place when the National Courts request that the ECJ clarifies whether National 
																																																						
4 It distinguishes an applicant by right (“Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having 
its registered office in a Member State”) from an applicant by grace (any natural or legal person who do not satisfy 
the conditions to be considered an applicant by right).	
5 Hereunder there is no room for differentiation between the applications of say a Victim of a cartel and a journalist. 
6 In fact, it actually goes as far as stating “The right of access to the file shall not extend to confidential information 
and internal documents of the Commission or the competition authorities of the Member States.” This is in 
accordance with Regulation No 1/2003, Article 27, ‘Hearing of the parties, complainants and others’, (2). 
7 C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt.	
8 C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG. 
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rules regarding access of Victims to Leniency statements held by the National Competition 
Authorities are compatible with EU Law. 
In sum, Case-law that is relevant to this study arises from the above-mentioned sources: 
Regulation 1049/2001, Regulation 1/2003 and Directive 2014/104/EU. The cases that were 
chosen for analysis had to be found, organized and analyzed. It has been a significant task but an 
interesting and rewarding one. In this manner, it is now possible to present the audience with an 
organized source of analysis. We also believe that this basis (that is now intelligible) is very 
important to anyone wishing to understand this subject. 
The Three KEY Concepts of Our Analysis 
We have identified three KEY concepts relevant to our analysis: Commission’s Leniency 
Program; Whistleblower – a former member of a cartel that leaks information to the 
Commission in exchange for immunity; and Antitrust Victims - undertakings and final consumer 
seeking compensation for all the damages suffered. 
Leniency Program 
In the EU, there is a Leniency Program, since 19969, with two purposes: finding and destroying 
cartels and compensating Victims. According to the Online English Dictionary definition, 
“leniency” means: “clemency, the fact or quality of being more merciful or tolerant than expected.”. In 
practice, for the Commission, the meaning is basically the same: a cartel participant is invited to 
cooperate with the investigating authorities, saving himself from punishment. Usually, this means 
total or partial impunity from fines, but never from the civil law consequences of an infringement 
of EU Law10 (namely liability in damages caused to third parties). For impunity to be granted, the 
undertaking has to be the first to provide the Commission with all the documents relevant to the 
																																																						
9 Based on the United States (US) Department of Justice Corporate Leniency Policy of 1993 (which replaced the 
initial one of 1978), according to Wills (2006).	
10 Infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU.	
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investigation it possesses, showing total willingness to cooperate, and terminating its participation 
in the cartel11 (European Commission 2016). 
The Whistleblower 
On the one hand, in spite of the fact that their conduct is as corrupt as the one of other cartel 
participants, Leniency participants (or the Whistleblowers) are usually well protected by the 
Commission and the ECJ, since they reveal themselves to be precious sources of information in 
cartels’ apprehension12. 
On the other, although Leniency documents are extremely difficult to be obtained13 by third 
parties14, it is not impossible that this will happen. This is mainly because the Commission 
publishes two types of Decisions pursuant to each investigation that is undertaken. The first type 
of Decision is more restricted in detail (first non-confidential version) and is issued immediately 
after the investigation. The second type of Decision is much more detailed (the extended version).  
Cartel members who decide to take part in a Leniency Program are, ab initio, facing two risks: 
they may not receive complete pardon and they may (in the medium to long term) be exposed. 
Antitrust Victims 
Cartels have Victims who are forced to pay higher prices for the same products or are taken out of 
the market. And EU has said it is vital that Victims get compensation through cartel exposure. 
Victim compensation comes about in two ways. First, Victims eagerly wait for Commission’s 
																																																						
11 The undertaking may not be fit to apply to the Leniency Program if, at any time, it took steps to coerce others to 
participate in a cartel.	
12 At the heart of every investigation of cartels by the Commission is a so-called hearing officer. He/she manages the 
preliminary approach to the investigation, being responsible for organizing and conducting oral hearings and acting as 
an independent arbiter when a dispute about the effective exercise of procedural rights arises in antitrust proceedings. 
13 The Court only states this ruling on a case-by-case basis.	
14 Undertakings, individuals or even Member States injured by a cartel seeking to obtain grounds for compensation.	
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Decision to fish out elements on which to ground requests for compensation15. Secondly, Victims 
also badger the Commission incessantly with requests for information. 
The role of the ECJ and the Selected Case (Evonik Case) 
At the vertex of this conflict, when it comes before the Courts and in order to adjudicate on the 
balance between pardon and exposure of a Whistleblower, is the ECJ. The objective is to look at 
Court cases and see the decisions that have been made, opposing Victims and cartels, when there 
is no agreement between the parties and the Commission concerning the (quality and amount of) 
information that should be released after a Whistleblower has benefitted from the Leniency 
Program. That’s the reason for the majority of the cases to be in the format “some party” against 
“the European Commission”.16 
The main Case selected for discussion is the recent Evonik Degussa v Commission17. We feel that 
it represents both a clarification of the jurisprudence of the ECJ and a turn-around moment in the 
enforcement of the rules for the protection of Victims of cartels. On 14th March 2017, the 
European Court of Justice ruled on a request from a member of a cartel and participant in the 
Leniency Program (Evonik Degussa) to forbid the disclosure of confidential information the 
Commission had decided to publish. This case comes forth within both mentioned Regulations. 
It was expected that the ECJ would apply one of the two classical approaches: no access to 
competition files due to presumptions of harm or no documents for third parties. However, two 
unexpected facts took place in the Evonik case. The first was that the Commission broke the 
pattern of protection and proposed to release Whistleblower’s confidential information. The 
second was that when Evonik desperately sought comfort from the ECJ, the very Court that had 
																																																						
15 Whenever cartel members are notified by the Commission circa what is about to be published, before it is 
published, they are quick to file injunctions, attempting to impede the Commission from releasing information to the 
public.	
16 See Appendix 1 – Access to Competition Law Documents Case-law Table.	
17 C-162/15 P Evonik Degussa GMbH v Commission.	
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upheld the entire theory of presumptions of harm - even in spite of severe criticism from the 
doctrine (Rossi and Vinagre e Silva 2017) - changed route. 
This Work Project aims to analyze how the impact of this case might affect the management of 
European undertakings in general. How to manage information related to Leniency? 
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
The number of researchers that address the topic of public access to Leniency documents held by 
the EU demonstrates and confirms that this is a very interesting but complex subject. Therefore, it 
is only possible to analyze a small fraction of the vast related Literature. It presents a growing 
business relevance as undertakings and individuals are, more and more, interested in getting 
compensation when they are exposed to any situation they regard as unfair and cartels want to 
impede them from accessing restitution. 
Many authors, mainly in the legal field, have found of utmost importance to write and debate 
about cartels and how the Commission deals with them. Namely, regarding the access to Leniency 
documents, these authors have different theories concerning the most appropriate technique to 
disclose files, the amount of the files and the nature of those files. 
The main authors we decided to quote were Rossi & Ferro, Wils, Cauffman, Saavedra and 
Anastácio. Even though we know we should present them based on the theories they defend and 
not on who they are or they represent, we also believe that in this case it is very relevant to choose 
significant opinions from different geographical perspectives: Portugal, Germany, EU and the US. 
Usually, the methodology used to perform their research and reach their conclusions is a careful 
and critical examination of Court Cases, Opinion’s Advocate General, Pending Cases and other 
sources. Only a qualitative analysis is conducted since a quantitative one does not seem to help to 
understand the way this process of access to information occurs. The latter would only be 
adequate for the calculus of the right compensation to attribute to Victims. Nonetheless, if we 
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knew the number of pending cases of this sort in the ECJ, it could help realizing the dimension of 
this topic. 
Rossi and Ferro (2016) refer that the ECJ has demolished the once mandatory consideration of 
partial access18 (through Case Law) in order to protect the Leniency Program. According to these 
authors, that is the reason why private enforcement is so hard to obtain at the EU level. Still 
according to the same authors, this is not different from what occurs in Portugal and in other EU 
countries apart from Anglo-Saxon nations. Since its entry into force, Regulation No 1049/2001 
was seen as an opportunity for more access to documents and so more compensation. Later, 
Directive 2014/104/UE attempts to establish clearer rules. Its transposition to national law might 
be the beginning of a change. 
From a comparative perspective, Wils (2006) compares EU’s Leniency Notice with the US 
Department of Justice’s Corporate Leniency Policy, in what respects the conditions to apply and 
the way it attributes full immunity (both to fines and criminal charges) and orders its applicants to 
restitute, whenever possible, injured parties. Differently, EU’s Leniency Policy only concedes 
immunity to fines (total or partial) and no immediate restitution has to be made, which is a big 
difference, mainly regarding compensation efficacy. 
Linked both to EU and National Law, Cauffman (2011) and Anastácio (2012) analyze the possible 
modifications the Pfleiderer case might bring to the propensity to Leniency documents refusal 
which has been verified both in National Courts and in the ECJ. In the Pfleiderer case, where a 
Victim (Pfleiderer) applied for access to antitrust files held by the German National Competiton 
Authority, the Court ruled it could not be impossible for Victims to access cartel information, 
giving discretion to National Courts to “weigh, on a case-by-case basis, the respective interests in favor 
																																																						
18 Partial access occurs when a document is redacted and part of the information contained in it is blanked out.	
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of disclosure of the information provided voluntarily by the applicant for leniency and the protection of 
that information”19, without however forgetting Germany belongs to the EU.  
Cauffman (2011), Saavedra (2012) and Anastácio (2012) defend it is necessary to preserve the 
attractiveness of the Leniency participation because it benefits directly many injured parties, with 
the only exception of the ones affected by the Leniency participants (who have to be protected, for 
the sake of the effectiveness of the Program). Saavedra (2012) proposes a solution for the 
document disclosure balance: only Leniency participants for immunity should be completely 
protected; the other cartel participants, even if they cooperate with the Commission later, should 
not. Therefore, the Commission should bring a quasi-Pfleiderer balance test into deliberation and 
enable Regulation No 1049/2001 to follow-on actions. 
But there seems to be still room to investigate what could be done so that Leniency participants’ 
Victims could also be compensated. These Victims should be compensated and whenever they are 
not, there is an inconsistency in the Leniency Program, because it was created with that initial 
purpose. In fact, the uncertainties as to the progress and setbacks of the Commission and the ECJ 
relating to information access given to Victims is an untenable situation. It seems then appropriate 
to study this problem from a more managerial perspective, in order to find a better solution, 
already incorporating possible changes brought with the Evonik case. It would be also interesting 
to consider the impacts on an undertaking that falls due to a cartel situation or an undertaking 
deciding to join a cartel or even a cartel participant considering applying to the Leniency Program. 
Overall, will the Evonik case allow for more access to files but less collected information? 
The objective of this Work Project is to find a hypothetical outcome which promotes more cartel 
findings and at the same time more Victims’ remedies. 
 
																																																						
19 C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt. 
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III. Methods and Cases 
The methodology used was a qualitative documental analysis, mainly based on Case-law (Court 
cases on access to Competition documents), pending cases, orders, decisions, a detailed analysis 
and comment of the Evonik Case, literature interpretation, and rational hypothesis discussion. 
Concerning Case-law on Access to EU Competition Law related Documents, 52 cases were 
analyzed following a chronologically organized table20, containing ECJ Judgments on Access to 
Documents from 1998 until 201721. The analyzed cases, where Victims mainly used Regulation 
1049/200122, illustrate both the effort of Victims to obtain documentary evidence from the 
Commission (fundamental to assure compensation) and the reaction of cartels to these requests. 
We are particularly interested in the reaction of cartels. A research by Member States’ support 
given to the applicants (or to the Commission) was also performed.23 
One could immediate conclude that for more than two decades this problem has been addressed at 
Court several times, both by public and private parties, raising its intensity over the last 5 years. 
And there are not few times when the Court annuls the Commission’s refusal of disclosing certain 
documents, giving a partial and sometimes even ambiguous response.  
Specifically on Access to Leniency Documents legal framework24, 17 cases from these 52 
(roughly 33%) were identified. From this sample, the number of cases where applicants were 
Victims of cartels seeking compensation (11 out of 17) was higher than the number of cases 
where applicants were cartel and Leniency Program participants demanding for confidentiality 
(the remaining 6 cases)25. However, out of the 11 cases where the applicants were Victims of 
																																																						
20 See Appendix 1 – Access to Competition Law Documents Case-law Table. 
21 The analyzed cases have their beginning dates ranging from 1996-2015 and Judgment dates from 1998-2017.	
22 On the 52 analyzed cases, Reg. 1049/2001 was used on 45 of them and Reg. 1/2003 on 14 of the cases.	
23 See Appendix 2 – Statistical Table of Member States Intervention.	
24 See Appendix 3 – Access to Leniency Documents Case-law Table. 
25 See Appendix 4 - Leniency Case-law: Number of Victims of Cartels (seeking compensation) vs Number of Cartel 
Members (demanding confidentiality).	
	 13	
Cartels, in 6 there were Cartel interventions seeking to impede the documents’ release. This is 
illustrated in the Pie Chart presented below (Fig. 2).  
These 17 cases were examined in deeper detail and compared to Evonik’s ruling whenever 
justified. Noticeably, a significant part of the applicants (9 out of 17) were Germans. The most 




















In Bank Austria v Commission26, the applicant (a cartel member) tried to impede the publication 
of the Commission’s decision to impose fines on the “Lombard Club” (a bank cartel), alleging 
professional secrecy violation and asking for interim relief27 which was denied. 
In EnBW v Commission 28, a Victim required access to Leniency documents circa a cartel of “gas 
isolated switch air”. Even though the Commission argued that the disclosure “would deter future 
potential leniency participants”, the Court protected the applicant, annulling the refusal of the 
																																																						
26 Case T-198/03 Bank Autria v Commission.	
27 The request of a grant by the Court to mantain a pending trial until the question is solved.	




Access to Leniency Documents Applicants
Victims of Cartels with Cartel Intervention
Victims of Cartels without Cartel Intervention
Cartel Participants
Fig. 2 - Access to Leniency Documents Applicants 
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Commission to disclose, once the latter had justified the refusal based on non-applicable 
exceptions. Nonetheless, on its appeal29, the Commission won. 
In NL v Commission30, the Kingdom of the Netherlands (NL) was asking for a file as Victim of a 
Dutch cartel for the supply of road pavement bitumen, but the Court dismissed the action stating 
that Member States should “facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks”, namely the need to 
protect files in the Leniency Program. 
In CDC v Commission31, the applicant was a group of Victims (CDC – Cartel Damage Claims) 
seeking access to documents to justify its right to demand compensation from “the hydrogen 
peroxide and perborate” cartel32. The Court decided in favor of the applicant, after the 
Commission failed at proving the content would undermine the investigation. 
In Reagens v Commission33 partial access was conceded to this Victim but only to non-
confidential information (still very limited data). 
In Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission34, a cartel participant (of the cartel where Evonik 
Degussa was the Whistleblower) sought restriction of confidential information. Since rejecting a 
claim for confidentiality violated the professional secrecy principle, the Court suspended the 
Commission’s rejection of a claim for confidentiality. However, it was again a dubious verdict, 
because the ECJ also dismissed the interim relief.  
In LVM v Commission35, the “automotive glass” cartel asked to intervene (probably in order to 
become aware of the documents disclosed to the Victim - LVM), but the action was dismissed. 
																																																						
29 Case C-365/12 P Commission v EnBW.	
30 Case T-380/08 NL v Commission.	
31 Case T-437/08 CDC v Commission. 
32 Evonik Degussa belonged to this cartel and since it was the Whistleblower, it acted in this case as a supporter of the 
defendant (the Commission).	
33 Case T-181/10 Reagens v Commission. 
34 Case T-345/12R Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission.	
35 Case T-419/12 LVM v Commission.	
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In AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission36, the cartel participants of the above 
mentioned automotive glass cartel requested for confidential treatment, opposing themselves to 
any Victims’ access to related documents. The Court rejected it, and dismissed its appeal case37. 
Other Court cases were simply removed, meaning an agreement was negotiated and there was no 
need for further trial. 
Concerning European Institution’s opinion towards this issue, the Council of the European Union 
and the Commission have gained reputation as pro-institutional interveners, while the Parliament 
has demonstrated to be a more pro-access intervener. 
In the results of the Case-law analysis performed for this research, it is also possible to distinguish 
Member States who are pro-access (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden) from the 
more conservative ones (Czech Republic, France, Germany and Spain), by statistically registering 
the amount of times they intervene for the release of data or confidentiality treatment. 
Similarly to other Leniency Programs across the globe, the US Department of Justice and UK 
Office of Fair Trading have the “Amnesty Plus”- an additional reduction of the fine in the first 
cartel case, if that cartel participant denunciates another cartel. In fact, there is a high probability 
that an undertaking participates in more than one cartel, obtaining economies of scale by 
overcoming normative and moral barriers, organizational planning and experience (Wils, 2006). 
Maybe this could be an option for the EU to consider. 
But can anyone trust a Whistleblower, the one who has already betrayed once? 
Actually, the Commission needs the denunciator. Therefore, it might be said that effective 
Public enforcement requires a shady actor, until better methods are found. This amounts to the 
reverse side of love for a thief: by conceding him this pardon and then protecting him against the 
																																																						
36 Case T-465/12 AGC Glass and Others v Commission.	
37 Case C-517/15 P AGC Glass and Others v Commission.	
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disclosure of the information which he provided and that condemns him, Victims of cartels are 
abandoned to their own fate, without opportunity for civil actions for damages. This occurs 
because what the Leniency Program does is exactly offer the Whistleblower protection, not only 
in immunity to fines, but also against requests for access to documents of the Commission files on 
cartel cases. This is where the Court traditionally stated there was presumed harm to the 
investigation. 
On 14th March 2017 something seems to have changed. This change was brought about by the 
ruling of the ECJ with the case C-162/15 P Evonik Degussa v Commission. As explained before, 
this Case is not about a Victim asking for access to the Commission’s files on cartels. The Case is 
about the Whistleblower (Evonik Degussa) seeking to impede the Commission from releasing 
information ex oficio38 (and erga omnes39) via the rules that govern Leniency Proceedings 
(Sectoral Rules) as Regulation No 1/2003. Besides, Evonik Degussa proposed that Regulation No 
1049/2001 should be used in such a way that the presumptions of harm developed in the past 
(when Victims wanted to access the file) via Regulation No 1049/2001 should be superimposed 
onto the Sectoral Proceedings of access to Leniency documents. Evonik (the Whistleblower) held 
that publish that confidential information, including several business secrets, in a non-confidential 
document would undermine the principle of equal treatment and legitimate expectations that 
substitutes the basis of the Leniency Program. Moreover Evonik also held that the Hearing Officer 
had behaved inadequately. Who is right? 
IV. Final Discussion and Analysis of the Benefits of Role-play in Leniency Program 
As previously proved with multiple evidence, Antitrust is one of the areas where access to 
documents was made very restrict by the Court. In fact, there is a clear trade-off between the 
																																																						
38 Legal Latim expression meaning “out of duty”.	
39 Legal Latim expression meaning “for everyone”.	
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information the Commission wants to get (through granting immunity to the one that provides that 
evidence) to punish cartels – public enforcement - and the one it wants to share to help victims 
being compensated – private enforcement. As Cauffman (2011) mentioned the threat of disclosing 
information is that it “(…) may discourage cartel participants from applying for leniency in the first 
place, which would significantly impede the discovery and punishment of cartels, which would in turn lead 
to a lower degree of compensation of cartel damage.” 
In the case of Evonik Degussa, the latter sought to have the Court declaring that even when the 
Commission itself finds that certain information (concerning the Whistleblower) may be released 
ex oficio by the Commission (after 5 years), under Regulation No 1/2003 and regardless of 
requests from Victims, the Court should treat the matter as if the request for information had been 
originated from a Victim, and therefore consider the presumed harm clause. The Court refused 
the request and stated in paragraph 79 of Evonik’s Judgement that both regulations involved have 
different objectives: Regulation No 1049/2001 governs third party access whilst Regulation No 
1/2003 governs the publication of Commission Decisions finding infringements of Trade. And 
that the restrictions (to access) governing the first may not be superimposed onto the second. 
In fact, we believe it is still early to understand exactly what this means. We think that wherever 
there is Sectoral detail (take Regulation No 1/2003 for example), the Court always ensures that 
those rules override Regulation No 1049/2001. The Court states that if it is the Commission itself 
that considers that the information may be released, then there is no place to presume that the 
release of information will be harmful to the Commission’s investigation. Also from a formal 
point of view, in this decision, the weight of Sectoral detail (in this case Antitrust) is heavier than 
any general rule, regardless of the substance. It does not matter which one grants more or less 
access, what matters is that in this case the Sectoral rule (coupled with the Commission’s 
discretion) overrides the general one (that is deemed to be non-applicable). 
	 18	
Now an undertaking (i.e. Victim) of a cartel might have a greater chance of managing the access 
to a document protected under the Leniency Program. This even without requesting the 
documents. As the Commission may decide to publish it ex oficio. All things considered, 
Whistleblower shall have some benefits via the reduction of fines, but he cannot be pardoned on 
its bad conduct as a member of a cartel. The risk is that every measure has its consequences, and 
therefore the Whistleblower will no further be willing to provide information to the Commission 
in the future, knowing its protection will be weaker. 
Importantly, the Court is beginning to construe40 a rebuttable presumption that after a five-year 
period the information, normally, loses its confidential status41. Nonetheless, in our opinion, five 
years is a very short time in business terms and also in an undertaking’s longevity, therefore it 
might be prudent to protect the Whistleblowers longer. 
Still, as the Court can only deliver its ruling on precisely what is being asked, it might be said that 
Evonik should have opposed the argument that information will still be relevant after 5 years. It is 
reasonable to acknowledge that undertakings considering to confess Cartel involvement, will from 
now on be aware that their protection is not ad aeternum. 
However, there are not only economic and legal aspects to take into consideration when protecting 
the Whistleblower. The moral and social damage may also be substantial. In fact, it is easier if we 
think of it in micro terms and then move on to macro. 
With that purpose, lets imagine that the Whistleblower is not an undertaking among others in a 
cartel, but an individual inside a corporation who decides to expose a fraudulent situation. If after 
he reveals this secret information to the Commission or to a National Competent Authority, the 
Commission releases information that specifically allows to identify that individual, he will not 
																																																						
40 In paragraphs 63 to 67 of the Evonik Case.	
41 Under Regulation No 1/2003.	
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only be fired and sued, but he will also be regarded as a traitor by the whole industry. Illustrative 
of such an argument, according to The Guardian, almost fifty years ago, Stanley Adams decided 
to became a Whistleblower, by handling over to the Commission a series of documents 
denunciating Roche’s participation in a vitamin cartel (“Blowing the final whistle 2001”). When it 
was found the documents had came from Adams’ office he was immediately fired and sued. He 
was publicly crucified and regarded as a traitor. Realizing her husband was going to be in-
prisoned for industry espionage, Adam’s wife committed suicide. Only ten years later he did 
managed to have some restitution, that certainly did not cover all his losses. 
Taking all these factors into consideration, it is fair to argue that the Commission should erase 
from the documents and data to be disclosed anything that could possibly incriminate the 
Whistleblower, but this could be very hard to ensure. 
Until now, in principle, Victims would not be able to access cartel documents to require 
compensation. With the Evonik case, the Court seems to have opened a new insight, by stating 
that if the Commission considers appropriate to release certain cartel documents the 
Whistleblower should not be allowed to impede it. This is an entirely new paradigm for managing 
confidential information and the Leniency Program. The Court appears to be giving the first steps 
towards more cartel Victims’ protection, and this will certainly have impacts in the management 
of EU undertakings. In Judicial terms, the Court has delegated a high degree of freedom of 
decision to the Commission, which will be taken further on into account by all interveners in this 
type of processes. We will have to be very attentive if, in the near future, any Whistleblower will 
be able to impede the Commission from exposing certain information. If that occurs, the Court 
will be giving two contradictory answers, aggravating this topic’s ambiguity. We also have to take 
into consideration that the Court reinforced the responsibility of the Hearing Officer (on 
paragraphs 55 and 56 of the Evonik case) and to observe the impact of this in future judgements. 
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The most immediate hypothesis that comes to our minds for this balance between private and 
public enforcement would be to maintain the present situation, and try to develop the Leniency 
Program even in the context of doubtable protection to the Whistleblowers and very restrict access 
and limit compensation to the Victims. 
The second solution would be a more ingenious and costly side-deal. Considering that the most 
important factor is that the Commission effectively receives the information, the latter could work 
as middleman in the compensation and restitution process to the injured parties. The Commission 
could make a complete theatrical staging, secretly planned with the Whistleblower (through a sort 
of a side deal based on confidential clauses), where the Whistleblower pretends to be accused 
alongside with the other cartel members and then the Commission pays for all his expenses and 
grants full protection to this Whistleblower. The Commission would pay to truly protect its 
source of information. But would it be possible to make this kind of agreement? In our opinion, 
the main risks would be information leaks and cartels trying to take advantage of this situation by 
setting up fake scenarios. If that happens, the solution would probably work only during some 
years but it could be fundamental for the Commission to understand how cartels internally 
coordinate. Even though the European Authorities would be totally forgiving a guilty participant 
of a cartel, maybe that is the price they must pay to enhance the Leniency Program. 
V. Conclusion 
To sum up, we have no doubts that information is something crucial and its use and release has to 
be very well managed by every undertaking and National or European Authority, in all occasions. 
This is a point of no return. 
Nevertheless, the solutions the Court has been presenting are somehow ambiguous: even though 
most of the times they protect the Whistleblower, sometimes they also give some reason to the 
injured parties. 
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The impact of the decision taken in Evonik Case is still difficult to measure but we believe that not 
protecting the Whistleblower may jeopardize the future of the Commission’s Leniency Program. 
That is the reason why we defend it is fundamental to find an alternative solution and we trust the 
proposed side-deal would allow for more information and simultaneously more access to it. 
VI. Direction to Further Research 
We confidently believe this subject could be further explored, using a more quantitative approach 
- Game Theory, in order to determine the incentives cartel’s participants have to collaborate with 
the Commission within the existing or enhanced Leniency Program. Additionally, a model to 
quantify how much it would be fair for the ones injured by a cartel to receive, depending on 
different (and well-proofed) variables, would also be a valid contribute. 
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Appendix 2 - Statistical Table of Member States Interventions  
 
Interventions (number of times) Pro Access Against Access 
Czech Republic - 2 
Denmark 7 - 
Finland 8 - 
France - 3 
Germany (many German applicants) - 1 
Netherlands 2 - 
Spain - 2 
Sweden 13 - 
United Kingdom 1 3 
Council - 2 
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Appendix 4 - Leniency Case-law: Number of Victims of Cartels (seeking compensation) vs Number of Cartel Members 
(demanding confidentiality) 
 
Victims 11 out of 17 
Cartel Members 6 out of 17 
Victims + Cartel Members Interventions 6 out of 11 
 
